29. Esteem and morality

When people are in competition, and their self-esteem depends on the outcome, the battle will absorb a large share of their energy and attention; and to that extent they cannot afford real interest for others. I think that the pervasiveness of the need for esteem should not be a reason for moral cynicism; it is an urgent reason for an accepting attitude, and for the moral heralding of mixed motives. I wrote this in post # 27, and I will now argue it more extensively.

Esteem and reputation are basic human needs and it can be argued that these needs are at the heart of the phenomenon of eternal scarcity: people are in perennial competition for the scarce good of esteem. The Dutch philosopher Rutger Claassen takes this perspective on scarcity in a very interesting book: Het eeuwig tekort (“the eternal deficit”) of 2004. He starts his analysis with economics, which has introduced a view of scarcity as a fundamental and generalized phenomenon (as opposed to a view of scarcities as concrete and temporary). Basically, our wants and needs are boundless. Utilitarianism and liberalism have contributed an enthusiastic appreciation of these boundless needs and wants. In a liberal anthropology, this basic human drive comes from the inside; it originates in the desire to develop one’s capacities and talents. This is a one-sided view, since it neglects that desires also have a social origin. The need for power or reputation is a separate, basic and powerful driver of personal development and this in turn is an important reason for competition, since these “positional goods” are inherently scarce. Liberalism acknowledges competition, and takes a sunny view on it; competition is cherished because it stimulates the flourishing of human talents and excellence. But the darker sides of competition are neglected, because scarcity is neglected: scarcity goes underground in liberalism, as Claassen expresses it. In order to understand the scarcity, and to find ways of dealing with it, we need an anthropology which acknowledges the social backgrounds of what we desire, and which therefore includes the notions of mimetic desire (stemming from Girard) and of competitive desire for the scarce goods of power or esteem (stemming from Hobbes, Rousseau, Adam Smith…). When we take these concepts into anthropological account, the shadow sides of competition easily spring to the eye: rivals are so absorbed in fighting each other that they cannot afford real interest for others. Competition for esteem results in indifference and instrumentalization towards those who are not in the battle. This leads to physical, psychological, moral and spiritual misery for everyone: exhaustion and loneliness for those who battle; neglect, poverty and lack of esteem for the others.

If the drive for esteem is really basic and ever-present in human beings, we find ourselves in a universe in which pure disinterested motivation is very rare. Is this a morally bleak universe? If behaviour is seen as morally good only if it is completely unselfish, only the Mother Teresa’s of this world will qualify. In other words, if we equate moral behaviour with moral purity we will be structurally disappointed, and cynicism towards what parades as moral behaviour looks inevitable. This was the view of Bernard Mandeville, who saw moral behaviour as resulting from the drive for esteem, or vanity, and therefore said that “publick virtue” arises from “private vice”.  

Claasssen is also cynical, but in a less generalized way. What he objects to is selfishness that masquerades as unselfishness: “In reality we see that the ambition of many cosmopolitan do-gooders knows no bounds: the flags and edicts of rich people, rich countries and rich companies parade proudly on schools and hospitals in the third world” [my translation]. Such show-off, in his eyes, amounts to “cynical misuse”: unselfish behaviour becomes an instrument in the battle for esteem. His cynicism it not directed at our need for esteem, but at our denial of that need.

I think that Claassen is right in criticizing this denial, as it indeed means that the shadow sides of the need for reputation go “underground”. But if our need for esteem is so basic, I think that we should take a milder and more compassionate attitude towards it. Cynicism, even selective cynicism, is not the most helpful attitude. It neglects that these do-gooders who are so eager for moral recognition may also be motivated by real concern and the desire to help, and that this is really and significantly different from a situation in which the competition for esteem leaves room only for indifference towards others. 

Human behaviour stems from a mixture of motives. If the presence of the selfish need for esteem in this mix is a reason for moral cynicism, then the prospect for morality is indeed bleak. Expectations of disinterested purity make us reject as immoral everything that is not purely disinterested. But such a conclusion easily turns a blind eye to the very real differences that can be present in the rest of the mix, and in the (meta-) way we deal with our need for esteem, societally and individually. This blind eye is serious, because if the need for esteem is unavoidably, our hope should precisely be on how we deal with it and with which other motives we combine it.

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